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ABSTRACT—Conservation easements, a valuable tool in the 
conservationist’s toolbox, have grown increasingly popular since the 
1980s, when Congress introduced changes to the federal tax code making 
easement donations more financially attractive. And with deductions 
reaching hundreds of thousands, or even millions, of dollars, conservation 
easement deductions are big business. However, expanded incentives and 
loosened regulations invite abuse, especially when the tax implications are 
large and donated easements are hard to value. Valuation of real estate 
remains an inexact science, dependent on inconsistent appraisal methods 
and subjectivity. Conservation easements can be even more difficult to 
value than other easements because, by their very nature, they are often 
placed on a parcel of land with high idiosyncratic value. Thus, easement 
valuations can vary wildly and justifying a high valuation is not difficult. It 
should come as no surprise, then, that the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) 
has examined conservation easement valuations more closely in recent 
years. Taxpayers risk large fines while the IRS struggles to effectively 
identify and curb abuse. Both sides would benefit from greater 
predictability, and as the IRS continues its aggressive litigation, a solution 
is sorely needed. This Note examines in Part I conservation easements and 
valuation methods for federal conservation easement deductions. Part II 
explores recent challenges to taxpayer application of these methods and the 
problems with the current valuation system revealed by those cases. 
Finally, Part III first reviews recent proposed reforms to conservation 
easement deduction valuation as well as their shortfalls, and then 
introduces a recommendation that would simplify the valuation process as 
well as promote greater use of conservation easements. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 Drive about three hours north from San Francisco on the 101 and 
head inland on California State Route 20 and you will find, nestled in the 
foothills of the North Coast Mountain Range, 882 acres of undeveloped 
wilderness known as the Blue Lakes Ranch.1 Owned by Michael S. 
Mountanos, the ranch serves primarily a recreational purpose, including 
deer hunting.2 Surrounded almost entirely by federally owned land, the 
Mountanos family can only access the property through an easement on 
federal land restricted to single-family use.3 
In 2005, Mountanos donated a conservation easement on the ranch to 
the Golden State Land Conservancy.4 He subsequently claimed a valuation 
of $4,691,500 for the easement, claiming the maximum allowed deduction 
of $1,343,704 for the 2005 tax year.5 Mountanos carried forward the 
remainder of the deduction for tax years 2006, 2007, and 2008.6 The IRS 
then challenged Mountanos’s deduction, claiming a misuse of the before-
 
1 Mountanos v. Comm’r, 105 T.C.M. (CCH) 1818, 1818 (2013). 
2 Id. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. at 1818–19. 
5 Id. at 1819. A taxpayer may claim a deduction equal to the value of the donated conservation 
easement. 26 U.S.C. § 170(b)(1)(E) (2012). However, taxpayers are capped at a certain amount 
annually, the excess of which, subject to certain limitations, may be carried forward up to fifteen years. 
Id.; see also infra Part I.A.  
6 Peter J. Reilly, Conservation Easement No Deduction for Hypothetical Vineyard, FORBES (June 5, 
2013, 8:33 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/peterjreilly/2013/06/05/conservation-easement-no-
deduction-for-hypothetical-vineyard/ [http://perma.cc/44JT-GZHT]. 
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and-after method of valuation.7 The Tax Court in 2013 accepted the IRS’s 
arguments, finding the easement’s actual value to be zero and imposing a 
40% penalty on Mountanos’s tax deficiency for the last three years he 
claimed the deduction.8 
Mountanos’s reversal of fortune—in the form of a $1.5 million invoice 
from the IRS—is not uncommon. In recent years, a flurry of cases brought 
by the IRS has wreaked similar havoc on many taxpayers’ returns.9 
Ultimately, Mountanos ended up no worse off due to the fine, thanks to a 
statute of limitations relieving liability for 2005, but still faced an 
unexpected tax bill of over $1 million for underpayment and penalties in 
tax years 2006–2008.10 Others were not so lucky.11 
The Mountanos case reveals deeper problems with the current 
conservation easement valuation regime. First, the burden of proof and 
other procedural rules promote an all-or-nothing valuation result: 
Mountanos held the burden of proving that his calculation supported his 
$4.7 million valuation,12 and his failure to meet that burden resulted in a 
valuation of zero and a substantial fine.13 Most likely, the easement was not 
truly valueless, but its real value may not be capable of measurement by a 
market-based approach.14 In fact, a predominant factor in conservation 
easement donation is often the worry or frustration that future owners will 
view the property solely through a financial lens and not properly consider 
its conservation value.15 
 
7 Taxpayers can abuse this method by inflating the before-easement value and deflating the after-
easement value to maximize the difference between the two. See infra Part I.B.2 and accompanying 
notes. 
8 Mountanos, 105 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1822. 
9 The IRS shows no sign of slowing down. As of May 2014, courts had issued decisions in over 
forty separate cases regarding conservation easement valuation since 2005, with eleven coming in 2013 
and six in the first five months of 2014. NANCY A. MCLAUGHLIN & STEPHEN J. SMALL, TRYING TIMES: 
IMPORTANT LESSONS TO BE LEARNED FROM RECENT FEDERAL TAX CASES INVOLVING CONSERVATION 
EASEMENTS 68–70 (2014). The IRS also continues to litigate conservation easements on various other 
technical grounds. E.g., Zarlengo v. Comm’r, 108 T.C.M. (CCH) 155 (2014). 
10 See Reilly, supra note 6. Reilly estimates that Mountanos saved as much as $470,000 by 
claiming the conservation easement deduction in 2005, as compared to an estimated $440,000 fine. Id. 
11 See, e.g., Gorra v. Comm’r, 106 T.C.M. (CCH) 523, 523 (2013) (taxpayer facing a total 
deficiency of $104,971 and total penalties of $37,431); Pollard v. Comm’r, 105 T.C.M. (CCH) 1249, 
1250 (2013) (taxpayer facing a total deficiency of $217,482 and total penalties of $43,497).  
12 Mountanos, 105 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1819. 
13 Id. at 1822. 
14 See infra Part II.C; cf. Brian Angelo Lee, Just Undercompensation: The Idiosyncratic Premium 
in Eminent Domain, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 593, 595 (2013) (“[T]here is a well-established consensus 
[that] . . . the fair market value standard systematically undercompensates . . . because individual 
owners value particular pieces of property for many personal reasons not shared by the market as a 
whole.”).  
15 See, e.g., CAMILLA M. HERLEVICH & LEE LEWIS LEIDY, CONSERVATION & HISTORIC 
PRESERVATION EASEMENTS TO PRESERVE NORTH CAROLINA’S HERITAGE 8 (2d ed. 2004), 
http://www.coastallandtrust.org/images/CoastalLandTrust/site/home/media-library/conservation-
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On a certain level, this issue fits into the same trade-off calculation 
inherent in all tax deductions between biasing the government or the 
taxpayer.16 A danger in not finding a proper balance is that downward 
pressure on valuation and threats of financial liability will discourage 
conservation easement donations. Congress’s aggressive expansion of the 
conservation easement deduction and the concomitant increase in the 
creation of such easements indicates that the deduction is an important 
factor to landowners.17 But some taxpayers, facing this perilous labyrinth of 
valuation methods, may decide that claiming a conservation easement 
deduction is not worth the trouble.18 Of course, high-income individuals 
facing hundreds of thousands of dollars in tax savings quickly justify hiring 
tax and appraisal professionals. However, simplifying the conservation 
easement valuation system would open the deduction to lower-income 
individuals who might donate a conservation easement on their historic 
home or other smaller-scale properties.19 As development continues to 
encroach on open spaces and historic landmarks, private-sector 
conservation has become critical to preserving our natural and cultural 
resources.20 
The ultimate effect is that the tax code fails to realize its potential to 
effectively encourage donations of conservation easements.21 This Note 
begins by exploring the benefits of conservation easements, then discussing 
the conservation easement deduction program and outlining the various 
valuation methods used. Next, this Note assesses the problems that recent 
 
historic-preservation-easement-book.pdf [http://perma.cc/NS99-XPEF] (“My sisters and I inherited the 
thousand-acre Cataloochee Ranch where we grew up[,] . . . one of the few remaining ‘balds’ or ancient 
mountaintop grassy ecosystems that have long graced the Southern Appalachians. . . . The ranch’s 
appraised value doubled in a few short years and would no doubt climb higher. We had no interest in 
selling, but our heirs would face increasingly insurmountable pressures to sell.”). 
16 See Interstate Transit Lines v. Comm’r, 319 U.S. 590, 593 (1943) (noting “the now familiar rule 
that an income tax deduction is a matter of legislative grace and that the burden of clearly showing the 
right to the claimed deduction is on the taxpayer”). See generally Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 
(1935) (establishing the business purpose and substance over form doctrines); Marvin A. Chirelstein & 
Lawrence A. Zelenak, Tax Shelters and the Search for a Silver Bullet, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1939 
(2005).  
17 See Zachary Bray, Reconciling Development and Natural Beauty: The Promise and Dilemma of 
Conservation Easements, 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 119, 129 (2010) (“From 1981 to 2005, the annual 
growth rate of private land trusts was . . . at its highest, about 16%, from 1985–1988—a period 
coincident with the early expansion of the federal tax deduction.”). 
18 See Kate B. Deal, Note, Incentivizing Conservation: Restructuring the Tax-Preferred Easement 
Acceptance Process to Maximize Overall Conservation Value, 101 GEO. L.J. 1587, 1603–04 (2013). 
19 See id. at 1601–02. 
20 See LEIDY & HERLEVICH, supra note 15, at 5 (noting that “private conservation action is more 
important than ever before” in light of the North Carolina government’s failure to fulfill the “Million 
Acre [Land Acquisition] Plan”). 
21 See generally Elliott G. Wolf, Note, Simultaneously Waste and Wasted Opportunity: The 
Inequality of Federal Tax Incentives for Conservation Easement Donations, 31 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 315 
(2012) (finding inefficiencies in the conservation easement deduction program). 
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litigation over valuation methods has revealed, including the uncertainty of 
appraisals, the risk of loss for incorrect valuations, and the current system’s 
inability to properly capture conservation value. Finally, this Note 
concludes by examining recent proposals before suggesting a new approach 
to reduce taxpayer risk of loss and facilitate the true recognition of 
conservation value. 
I. CONSERVATION EASEMENT DEDUCTIONS AND THEIR PURPOSE 
Conservation easements can cover a wide variety of properties and 
serve many different purposes. The core purpose of conservation 
easements, however, is to protect a property from the inexorable march of 
development. By law, qualifying conservation easements cover either 
unimproved land or historic buildings.22 
The conservation easement also solves the problem of finite 
ownership. One cannot own a property forever, but one may wish to protect 
a property from destruction forever.23 Conservation easements prevent 
future owners from altering the property contrary to the precepts of the 
easement.24 Typically, a conservation easement on open land will limit or 
restrict all development on the land, whereas a conservation easement on a 
historic building usually prohibits changes to the historic character of the 
exterior of the building (commonly known as a facade easement).25 
Conservation easements can be donated, typically upon sale of the 
underlying property, to a land trust, preservation organization, government 
agency, or similar not-for-profit organization that enforces the easement 
against future property owners. Conservation easements “run with the 
land,” such that after one is donated, an individual may freely alienate the 
land and any future owners will be subject to the easement. Thus, so long 
as the organization entrusted with enforcement of the conservation 
easement maintains enforcement, a property is protected from development 
indefinitely.26 
The idea behind the conservation easement tax deduction is simple. 
Congress recognizes the need for preservation of open land and historic 
buildings, yet owning the land outright, or “in fee,” would be expensive 
and inefficient.27 The conservation easement tax deduction encourages 
 
22 See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(d)(1) (as amended in 2009). 
23 See John L. Hollingshead, Conservation Easements: A Flexible Tool for Land Preservation, 
3 ENVTL. LAW. 319, 322–23 (1997). 
24 See id. at 321–30.  
25 See Jess R. Phelps, Preserving Preservation Easements?: Preservation Easements in an 
Uncertain Regulatory Future, 91 NEB. L. REV. 121, 126, 128–132 (2012).  
26 See Jess R. Phelps, Moving Beyond Preservation Paralysis? Evaluating Post-Regulatory 
Alternatives for Twenty-First Century Preservation, 37 VT. L. REV. 113, 143–44 (2012).  
27 See Hollingshead, supra note 23, at 322. State and local land trusts conserved over sixteen 
million acres in 2010, yet only two million of those acres were owned outright by the land trusts. LAND 
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private landowners to voluntarily restrict the use of their land in exchange 
for a decrease in taxes owed to the federal government.28 The deduction has 
succeeded in increasing the amount of land protected by conservation 
easements.29 In fact, one study estimated that conservation easements held 
by state and local land trusts grew from 128,000 acres in 1980 (when 
Congress overhauled charitable tax deductions) to 8.8 million acres in 
2010.30  
However, many commentators have recently questioned the program’s 
efficacy in relation to its conservation goals.31 But even its harshest critics 
call for reformation of the tax incentives, not elimination, recognizing the 
tax code’s unique role in promoting conservation.32 Although the relatively 
small size of the program would normally generate little attention from 
Congress,33 the expiration of expanded conservation easement deduction 
benefits at the end of 2014 has caused supporters to rally for their 
reinstatement.34 This unusual attention from Congress may represent an 
ideal opportunity for reform.35 
 
TRUST ALLIANCE, 2010 NATIONAL LAND TRUST CENSUS REPORT 5, http://www.landtrustalliance.org/
land-trusts/land-trust-census/2010-final-report [http://perma.cc/X9U-T369]. 
28 See Phelps, supra note 26, at 129. 
29 See Bray, supra note 17, at 129; see also Roger Colinvaux, The Conservation Easement Tax 
Expenditure: In Search of Conservation Value, 37 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 19 (2012) (“[T]here is little 
doubt that the easement program has been effective in generating easement contributions.”). 
30 Nancy A. McLaughlin, Perpetual Conservation Easements in the 21st Century: What Have We 
Learned and Where Should We Go from Here?, 2013 UTAH L. REV. 687, 690, 693. 
31 See, e.g., Colinvaux, supra note 29, at 21–26, 31–34 (“[A]n easement’s value for tax purposes is 
a negative value. . . . Unlike the value of other types of charitable contributions, easement value says 
little about the benefit to charity, or, as described here, the conservation value.”); Josh Eagle, Notional 
Generosity: Explaining Charitable Donors’ High Willingness to Part with Conservation Easements, 
35 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 47, 82 (2011) (positing that the federal government “overpay[s] for the 
public benefits created by conservation easements” by as much as “several hundred thousand dollars” 
per easement); Wolf, supra note 21, at 324–26 (“[T]ax incentives to induce the donation of 
conservation easements should not increase as incomes increases.”). 
32 See, e.g., Colinvaux, supra note 29, at 47–60 (proposing the replacement of the deduction with a 
tiered tax credit system); Eagle, supra note 31, at 88–89 (proposing the conversion of conservation 
easements to development rights); Wolf, supra note 21, at 326–30 (proposing the replacement of the 
deduction with a refundable tax credit). 
33 Conservation easement deductions represented less than 0.5% of charitable deductions in 2010. 
Richard Rubin, IRS Cracks Down on Breaks in Land of Rich Americans, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 22, 2013, 
3:07 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-11-06/irs-cracks-down-on-breaks-in-land-of-rich-
americans.html [http://perma.cc/KUC-3HKC]. Despite the small number of donations, easements 
represented the category with the second-highest average donation per return in 2010. Pearson Liddell 
& Janette Wilson, Individual Noncash Contributions, 2010, STATISTICS OF INCOME BULL. Winter 2013, 
at 64, 65, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/13innoncash10.pdf [http://perma.cc/CBJ4-
TGWF]. 
34 The Enhanced Easement Incentive, LAND TRUST ALLIANCE, http://www.landtrustalliance.org/
policy/tax-matters/campaigns/the-enhanced-easement-incentive [http://perma.cc/P25B-QH4U]. 
35 In February 2015, the House of Representatives voted 279–127 in favor of a bill to make the 
expanded benefits permanent, a measure also included by President Obama in his Fiscal Year 2016 
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A. Conservation Easement Deduction Requirements 
 Conservation easement deductions are permitted under 26 U.S.C. 
§ 170, which governs all charitable deductions in the tax code. The code 
generally disallows a deduction for the contribution of partial interest in a 
property, such as an easement, unless the donation is a “qualified 
conservation contribution.”36 Qualified conservation contributions comprise 
three elements: (1) a “qualified real property interest,” (2) donated to a 
“qualified organization” (3) “exclusively for conservation purposes.”37 
Conservation easements are a qualified real property interest by virtue of 
being a restriction on use granted in perpetuity.38 (Conservation easements 
are not inherently granted in perpetuity but must be to qualify for the 
deduction.) The definitions of “qualified organization” and “exclusively for 
a conservation purpose” are beyond the scope of this Note and have no 
bearing on the analysis that follows.39 
As with all deductions for charitable contributions, the conservation 
easement deduction may be claimed by businesses and individuals alike.40 
Individuals, however, are subject to certain limitations on the amount that 
may be claimed in a given year.41 Conservation easements receive a special 
carryover treatment, whereby if the value of a conservation easement 
deduction exceeds the allowable amount in the first year claimed, the 
balance of the deduction’s value may be applied in future tax years for up 
to fifteen years.42 
B. Methods of Conservation Easement Valuation 
Claiming the conservation easement tax deduction is a mostly simple 
affair, but requires a value to be placed on the donated easement, which 
may be a complex process. The intuitive answer to how a conservation 
easement should be valued might be to measure the value of what is 
conserved by the easement. Indeed, some have suggested that the program 
 
budget. How You Can Help, LAND TRUST ALLIANCE (July 30, 2014), 
http://www.landtrustalliance.org/policy/tax-matters/campaigns/how-you-can-help [http://perma.cc/
A5U3-TUCB]. 
36 26 U.S.C. § 170(f)(3)(B)(iii) (2012).  
37 Id. § 170(h)(1). 
38 Id. § 170(h)(2)(C). 
39 See id. § 170(h)(3) (definition of qualified organization); id. § 170(h)(4) (definition of 
conservation purpose); id. § 170(h)(5) (definition of exclusively for conservation purposes). Historic 
structures are subject to a variety of complicated rules for qualification and amount of deduction 
allowable, but do not see different treatment for valuation purposes. See id. 
40 See id. § 170(a). 
41 Id. § 170(b)(1)(B), (b)(1)(E)(i). The ultimate effect of these rules is that, in most cases, a 
conservation easement deduction will not offset more than 30% of the taxpayer’s adjusted gross 
income. 
42 Id. § 170(b)(1)(E)(ii). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
746 
be modified to better reflect the true conservation value of the easement.43 
However, the IRS—perhaps merely to stay consistent with the rest of the 
tax code—determines the value of the deduction to be the fair market value 
of the conservation easement at the time of donation.44 Thus, the IRS 
measures the easement’s value by the economic value relinquished, rather 
than the societal or other value created. 
A number of methods are used to measure the fair market value of the 
donated easement. The five most common methods are described below, 
along with the challenges these methods present to the taxpayer and the 
IRS. 
1. Comparable Sales Method.—Treasury regulations delineate two 
valid methods of determining the fair market value of a conservation 
easement, commonly known as the comparable sales and the before-and-
after methods.45 A plain reading of the regulation appears to make the 
comparable sales method mandatory when comparable sales exist.46 
Taxpayers have argued this position before, as in Trout Ranch, LLC v. 
Commissioner,47 but no court has yet ruled definitively on the matter. The 
Tenth Circuit, in the Trout Ranch appeal, seemingly endorsed a mandatory 
preference for the comparable sales method,48 but a subsequent Tax Court 
decision referred to the comparable sales method as merely “ideal,”49 thus 
leaving the question unresolved. Ultimately, the court found the sales 
records used by the taxpayer to be insubstantial, rendering the question 
moot.50 
The Trout Ranch series is not unusual in that regard. Unlike other 
forms of real estate, comparable sales for conservation easements are 
difficult to find because they are typically gifted and not sold on the open 
market.51 The pool of comparable sales is further reduced by the preference 
 
43 See e.g., Colinvaux, supra note 29, at 37–38; Nancy A. McLaughlin, Increasing the Tax 
Incentives for Conservation Easement Donations—A Responsible Approach, 31 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 109–
12 (2004). 
44 Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(h)(3)(i) (as amended in 2009). 
45 Id. 
46 Id. (“If there is a substantial record of sales of easements comparable to the donated easement . . . 
the fair market value of the donated easement is based on the sales prices of such comparable 
easements.”). 
47 Trout Ranch, LLC v. Comm’r (Trout Ranch I), 100 T.C.M. (CCH) 581, 584 (2010), aff’d, 493 F. 
App’x 944 (10th Cir. 2012). 
48 Trout Ranch, LLC v. Comm’r (Trout Ranch II), 493 F. App’x 944, 949–50 (10th Cir. 2012) 
(“[W]here a record of sales of comparable easements is available for meaningful comparison, the 
regulations require the appraisal be based on the comparable sales . . . method.”). 
49 Mountanos v. Comm’r, 105 T.C.M. (CCH) 1818, 1819 (2013). 
50 Trout Ranch II, 493 F. App’x at 950–51. 
51 Symington v. Comm’r, 87 T.C. 892, 895 (1986) (“Unfortunately, since most open-space 
easements are granted by deed of gift there is rarely an established market from which to derive the fair 
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for local comparable sales because values for similar properties can vary 
geographically.52 What makes Trout Ranch notable is that the taxpayer, 
Trout Ranch, LLC, used the comparable sales method yet still did not 
prevail. Trout Ranch, LLC, a residential development company, sought to 
divide sixty-six acres of undeveloped land into residential lots, and donated 
a conservation easement covering 384 acres of undeveloped land to the 
Crested Butte Land Trust.53 The taxpayer claimed a valuation of 
$2,179,849 for the easement, relying on a comparison of the price of four 
different conservation easements sold in the same county.54 
The court rejected each of the prior sales as being insufficiently 
comparable for use. Three of the four easements used restricted 
development on 100%, 96%, and 89% of the land, respectively, whereas 
the Trout Ranch easement only restricted development on usable land by 
45%.55 The fourth easement, while similar in the percentage of land 
restricted, provided no benefit to the remaining land developed, whereas 
the Trout Ranch easement allowed the encumbered land to be used as 
communal ranch land by the residents.56 
Trout Ranch illustrates the difficulty in finding comparable sales, 
especially for open land. Real estate tends to be highly differentiable and 
idiosyncratic; the court considered such physical features as views, river 
access, and highway access, each slightly different for each property.57 
Conservation easements are similarly numerous in their permutations, often 
designed to create a specific bundle of property rights rather than a blanket 
prohibition on development.58 Without a readily available pool of 
comparable sales, conservation easement donors must often resort to 
alternate methods of valuation. 
2. Before-and-After Method.—Rather than attempt to submit 
comparable sales, most taxpayers determine the easement’s value using the 
alternative method outlined in the Treasury Regulations: the before-and-
after method. As a “general rule,” fair market value under this method is 
defined as the difference between the land’s value before the donation of 
the conservation easement and the land’s value after the donation of the 
 
market value.”); see also Hilborn v. Comm’r, 85 T.C. 677, 688 (1985) (rejecting the comparable sales 
method after finding no established market for facade easements). 
52 Whitehouse Hotel Ltd. P’ship v. Comm’r (Whitehouse III), 139 T.C. 304, 329–30 (2012), aff’d, 
755 F.3d 236 (5th Cir. 2014) (rejecting the use of comparable sales in a national market where 
sufficient local comparable sales existed). 
53 Trout Ranch I, 100 T.C.M. (CCH) 581, 582 (2010), aff’d, 493 F. App’x 944 (10th Cir. 2012). 
54 Id. at 583–84. 
55 Id. at 585. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. at 584–85. 
58 See id. Proposed developments assessed by the Trout Ranch court included a single-family 
ranch, a planned housing development, and recreational land. Id. 
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conservation easement.59 If the easement results in financial benefit to the 
donor, such as receiving historic preservation tax credits from a facade 
easement, the financial benefit is subtracted from the value of the 
easement.60 
For example, the taxpayer’s appraiser in Scheidelman v. Commissioner 
valued her brownstone row house in the historic Fort Greene neighborhood 
of Brooklyn at $1,015,000.61 Scheidelman wished to donate a facade 
easement on the building to the National Architectural Trust that would 
prohibit alteration of the facade and require the owner to maintain the 
facade.62 The appraiser valued the row house with such restrictions at 
$900,000.63 The value of the conservation easement deduction was thus the 
difference between the two valuations, or $115,000.64 
Under this method, the taxpayer has two opportunities to increase the 
amount of the conservation easement deduction by either inflating the 
before-value or deflating the after-value. Easements are often placed on 
historic buildings or other land that requires specialized appraisal skills to 
reach an accurate before-value, and the extremely limited market for 
development restrictions makes calculating the after-value reliant on 
guesswork.65 Of course, the IRS has the same opportunities to show a 
decreased value in the deduction. 
When appraising a property’s before-value, one must consider the 
value of the property at its highest and best use.66 Such a use may differ 
greatly from its actual use, such as in Mountanos, and provides an 
opportunity for the taxpayer to inflate the appraisal value of the property. 
Mountanos claimed a high before-valuation, arguing that the land in 
question, while currently used only for recreation, could be put to more 
valuable use as a vineyard.67 The courts presume that the current use is the 
highest and best use,68 and the burden is on the taxpayer to show that an 
alternative use is “close[] in time” and “reasonabl[y] probab[le].”69 
Mountanos needed to show a higher and better use because the donated 
easement did not restrict the contemporaneous recreational use.70 The court 
found that creating a vineyard would not be possible because of other 
 
59 Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(h)(3)(i) (as amended in 2009).  
60 Id. 




65 Phelps, supra note 25, at 148–49.  
66 Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(h)(3)(ii) (as amended in 2009). 
67 Mountanos v. Comm’r, 105 T.C.M. (CCH) 1818, 1820 (2013). 
68 United States v. L.E. Cooke Co., 991 F.2d 336, 341 (6th Cir. 1993). 
69 Hilborn v. Comm’r, 85 T.C. 677, 689 (1985). 
70 Mountanos, 105 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1820. 
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restrictions placed on the land, including the lack of a permit to divert 
water from a nearby creek and a preexisting contract with the county to 
restrict development.71 Thus, because there was no difference in use before 
and after the easement, there was no difference in the property’s value, 
giving the conservation easement deduction a value of zero.72 As discussed 
in greater detail below, the “closeness in time” requirement is at odds with 
the perpetual nature of conservation easements, and ignores the ability of 
parties to take future actions, such as obtaining a water permit or breaching 
a contract. 
Treasury regulations specify that the after-valuation must consider the 
highest and best use after the conservation easement, which may give a 
different value than the before-valuation’s highest and best use or current 
use.73 This requirement was an issue in Whitehouse Hotel Ltd. Partnership 
v. Commissioner, where the taxpayer placed conservation easements on 
two adjacent historic buildings in downtown New Orleans: the Kress and 
the Maison Blanche.74 After the donation, the taxpayer combined the two 
buildings with the intention of converting the combined properties into a 
luxury hotel.75 
The taxpayer structured the easements in such a way that, if the two 
buildings were kept separate, they could build additional floors onto the 
Kress building.76 However, if combined into a single structure, the 
easement restrictions on the Maison Blanche would prevent construction on 
the Kress.77 The taxpayer claimed a conservation easement deduction of 
$7,445,000, the difference between a 780-room luxury hotel and a 720-
room luxury hotel (the additional sixty rooms being the hypothetical Kress 
addition).78 The Tax Court rejected the taxpayer’s valuation, finding that 
the conservation easements on their face did not preclude the construction 
of additional floors on the Kress building, giving no difference in value.79 
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit found that the Tax Court erred in not 
considering the imminent combination of the buildings because a 
subsequent buyer would likely purchase both buildings and consider them a 
single building.80 A corollary to Mountanos, the issue here is that of 
reasonable probability. The Tax Court thought it reasonably probable that 
 
71 Id.  
72 Id. at 1822. 
73 Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(h)(3)(ii) (as amended in 2009). 
74 Whitehouse Hotel Ltd. P’ship v. Comm’r (Whitehouse II), 615 F.3d 321, 324–25 (5th Cir. 2010). 
75 Id. at 325. 
76 Id. at 337. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. at 325–27. 
79 Whitehouse Hotel Ltd. P’ship v. Comm’r (Whitehouse I), 131 T.C. 112, 134–35 (2008), vacated, 
615 F.3d 321 (5th Cir. 2010). 
80 Whitehouse II, 615 F.3d at 338–39. 
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the buildings could be sold separately, allowing for a higher and better use, 
while the Fifth Circuit disagreed. 
The highest and best use is thus a “matter of valuation,” not a strict 
matter of fact.81 Determining the highest and best use of a property entails 
making several judgments backed by logic or intuition instead of 
economics or market data. Without an objective rubric, before-and-after 
valuation becomes much more of an art than a science, easily molded by 
the artistic flourishes of the appraiser. 
3. Reproduction Cost Method.—Where the comparable sales or 
before-and-after methods are unavailable, taxpayers usually turn to one of 
three methods of valuation not explicitly endorsed by the IRS but 
sometimes successful in the courts. The reproduction cost method is one 
that can be used when the conservation easement encumbers a historic 
building.82 The reproduction cost method is simply the calculation of what 
it would cost to reproduce a historic building. The courts disfavor this 
method because it “almost invariably tends to inflate valuation.”83 This is 
because the cost of reproduction determines the maximum price of a 
structure, not necessarily the fair market value, which would likely be 
lower due to negotiation, competition, and desired rates of return on 
investment.84 Further, the reproduction method is inappropriate where the 
building would not be reproduced if destroyed.85 Although this seems 
overly literal on first read, the reproduction cost would, by definition, be 
higher than the maximum market value if no one would be willing or 
required to rebuild the structure. 
The reproduction cost method is allowed in a small number of cases 
but is limited to those in which reproduction cost is the only method that 
will yield a useful result.86 Such situations arise “when the property to be 
valued is unique [and] its market limited.”87 To succeed, a taxpayer must 
also show that reproduction would represent a “reasonable business 
venture”88 and that the reproduction value would meaningfully correspond 
 
81 Id. at 339. 
82 Losch v. Comm’r, 55 T.C.M. (CCH) 909, 915 (1988). 
83 United States v. Benning Hous. Corp., 276 F.2d 248, 250 (5th Cir. 1960) (footnote omitted); see 
also Losch v. Comm’r, 55 T.C.M. (CCH) 909, 915 (1988) (“However, in dealing with an older, historic 
structure, it is highly questionable whether the replacement cost method can be used to provide 
meaningful results.”).  
84 See Benning, 276 F.2d at 250.  
85 United States v. Toronto, Hamilton & Buffalo Navigation Co., 338 U.S. 396, 403 (1949); see 
also Whitehouse III, 139 T.C. 304, 316 (2012), aff’d, 755 F.3d 236 (5th Cir. 2014) (“Petitioner has 
failed to convince us that . . . the owners of the building would want to, or would be required to, 
reconstruct that 100-year-old structure if it were destroyed.” (quoting Whitehouse I, 131 T.C. 112, 147 
(2008))). 
86 Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Kiernan, 366 N.E.2d 808, 812 (N.Y. 1977). 
87 Estate of Palmer v. Comm’r, 839 F.2d 420, 424 (8th Cir. 1988). 
88 Benning, 276 F.2d at 250. 
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to the fair market value.89 This extremely high burden of proof means that 
the reproduction cost method is rarely used and is of questionable 
application to conservation easement valuation.90 
4. Income Valuation Method.—The income valuation method of 
pricing conservation easements is also rarely employed. Under the income 
approach, the taxpayer calculates the discounted present value of all future 
cash flows that would derive from the encumbered property, but for the 
conservation easement.91 The value is further discounted by the application 
of a risk-adjusted rate of return.92 Essentially, this method is estimating 
how much income one would receive by owning the property and adjusting 
that downward by the time value of money and the investment risk. Similar 
to the reproduction cost method, this amount represents the maximum that 
a buyer would pay for the property, but may not accurately represent the 
true market value.93 
The income valuation method is disfavored, especially where other 
methods, such as comparable sales, are available.94 Calculating the present 
value of all future cash flows is very much a fact-intensive endeavor.95 The 
likelihood of succeeding in using this method depends largely on the 
reliability, predictability, and recentness of the data used.96 Much like the 
before-and-after method, the income valuation method is vulnerable to the 
heightened predictions of an overly optimistic or imaginative appraiser. 
Despite the difficulty, the income valuation method is successful in 
certain cases. Many of these cases involve the subdivision method, so 
named because it involves land that will be subdivided into several lots.97 
Generally, the lots are priced individually, their values added, and the costs 
of sale and development subtracted.98 While the income expectations of 
undeveloped land may be more predictable, each variable calculated can 
still be subject to a number of different possible values, differences that can 
quickly compound. This can add up to multiple experts coming to very 
 
89 Palmer, 839 F.2d at 424. 
90 See Whitehouse III, 139 T.C. at 316 (citing RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY 
§ 34A.06, 34A-54 (Michael Allen Wolf ed., 2012)).  
91 See Butler v. Comm’r, 103 T.C.M. (CCH) 1359, 1368 (2012). 
92 Heck v. Comm’r, 83 T.C.M. (CCH) 1181, 1188 (2002) (citing Estate of True v. Comm’r, 82 
T.C.M. (CCH) 27, 83 (2001)). Essentially, the riskier the future cash flows, the less a buyer is willing to 
pay. 
93 See Butler, 103 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1368. 
94 See Whitehouse I, 131 T.C. 112, 153 (2008), vacated, 615 F.3d 321 (5th Cir. 2010). 
95 See, e.g., id.; Heck, 83 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1188–93 (devoting six pages to valuing shares of a 
company). 
96 See Allison v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 979 F.2d 1187, 1200 (7th Cir. 1992) (remarking that income 
valuation is generally dependent on too many variables to be useful). 
97 See, e.g., Trout Ranch I, 100 T.C.M. (CCH) 581, 585 (2010), aff’d, 493 F. App’x 944 (10th Cir. 
2012).  
98 E.g., id. at 592–93. 
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different results—none of which might be considered accurate by the 
court—and large tax deficiencies for the taxpayer.99 In short, the income 
valuation method is difficult and only accepted as a last resort where better 
data is simply unavailable. 
5. Fixed Percentage Method.—One might think that a much simpler 
method of valuing a conservation easement would be to apply a fixed 
percentage based on the average diminution in value. Indeed, taxpayers 
commonly attempt this method.100 Despite its frequent use, the Tax Court 
has long held that the fixed percentage method is not a valid method of 
valuation.101 Interestingly, the Second Circuit overruled the Tax Court by 
upholding appraisals using the fixed percentage as “qualified”—even if 
unconvincing—appraisals, thus avoiding the application of penalties to the 
taxpayer.102 
C. Penalties for Inaccurate Valuation 
Valuing a conservation easement is not only difficult and imprecise, 
but also significant penalties can attach when the IRS successfully 
challenges a taxpayer’s valuation. Upon a successful challenge, the 
taxpayer is first liable for any tax that would have been due above what the 
taxpayer paid.103 The IRS may also pursue a 20% penalty for “inter alia, (1) 
negligence or disregard of rules or regulations; (2) any substantial 
understatement of income tax; or (3) any substantial valuation 
misstatement.”104 The taxpayer may be further liable for a 40% penalty if 
the underpayment of taxes is due to a “gross valuation misstatement.”105 
Such a misstatement exists where the reported conservation easement 
valuation is at least 400% more than the determined value.106 IRS 
 
99 See, e.g., id. at 590–91 (calculating an income valuation of $4.45 million for one of the 
properties, in contrast to the $5.6 million and $3.22 million values the taxpayer and IRS calculated, 
respectively). 
100 See, e.g., Scheidelman v. Comm’r (Scheidelman III), 105 T.C.M. (CCH) 1117, 1121 (2013), 
aff’d, 755 F.3d 148 (2d Cir. 2014) (“[Taxpayer’s appraiser] determined the value of the easement by 
applying an 11.33% discount to the value of the property. His derivation of that percentage was not 
based on reliable market data or specific attributes of [taxpayer’s] property, but rather on his analysis of 
what the courts and the IRS had allowed in prior cases.”); Gorra v. Comm’r, 106 T.C.M. (CCH) 523, 
526 (2013) (taxpayer simply applying 11% to the before-value); Graev v. Comm’r, 140 T.C. 377, 394 
(2013) (same). 
101 Scheidelman III, 105 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1121 (citing Nicoladis v. Comm’r, 55 T.C.M. (CCH) 
624, 629 (1988)). 
102 Scheidelman II, 682 F.3d 189, 198–99 (2d Cir. 2012). But see Rothman v. Comm’r, 104 T.C.M. 
(CCH) 127, 127 (2012) (rehearing taxpayers’ case after Scheidelman II and rejecting an appraisal that 
was “identical in all material respects to the appraisal in . . . Scheidelman” as unqualified). 
103 26 U.S.C. § 6211(a) (2012). 
104 Pollard v. Comm’r, 105 T.C.M. (CCH) 1249, 1255 (2013) (citing § 6662(a), (b)(1)–(3)). 
105 § 6662(h)(1). 
106 See id. § 6662(h)(2)(A)(ii)(I). 
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regulations further provide that where an easement is found to be valueless, 
thus making a percentage difference impossible to calculate, a gross 
valuation misstatement has occurred.107 
In recent cases, the IRS has often pursued the 40% penalty associated 
with a gross valuation misstatement, with varying levels of success.108 This 
is perhaps due in part to the relative ease of reaching a value of zero. The 
IRS needs only to show that the taxpayer failed to shift the burden of proof 
either as to a higher and better use, such as in Mountanos,109 or as to the 
proper application of the attempted valuation method, such as in Trout 
Ranch,110 and the easement is presumed valueless, automatically reaching 
the 400% threshold for a gross valuation misstatement. Taxpayers must be 
aware of the risks of failed valuations and should take steps to show 
reasonable, good faith reliance on a qualified professional to avoid 
penalties.111 
II. VALUATION PROBLEMS REVEALED BY RECENT LITIGATION 
Recent cases where the IRS successfully challenged the taxpayers’ 
reported value have highlighted the difficulties that valuation poses and the 
need for an alternative regime. The major flaws of the current valuation 
system can be grouped into three categories: (1) the complexity, 
imprecision, and unreliability of appraisals; (2) the cost and risk of loss 
from gross valuation misstatements; and (3) the failure of a market value 
approach to reflect true conservation value. This section concludes by 
assessing the scope of these problems. 
A. The Uncertainty of Appraisals 
Before donating a conservation easement, a taxpayer should hire a 
qualified appraiser to conduct an appraisal of the easement.112 While a 
qualified appraisal is not strictly necessary, claiming a charitable deduction 
 
107 Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-5(g) (as amended in 1992); see, e.g., Mountanos v. Comm’r, 105 T.C.M. 
(CCH) 1818, 1822 (2013). Most taxpayers reach a settlement with the IRS, so it is unknown how much 
of the penalty is typically paid. See infra Part II.D. 
108 See, e.g., Gorra v. Comm’r, 106 T.C.M. (CCH) 523, 537 (2013) (upholding penalties); Pollard, 
105 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1255–56 (rejecting the enhanced 40% penalty but upholding the 20% penalty); 
Evans v. Comm’r, 100 T.C.M. (CCH) 275, 280 (2010) (rejecting penalties). 
109 105 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1822. 
110 Trout Ranch I, 100 T.C.M. (CCH) 581, 583–84 (2010), aff’d, 493 F. App’x 944 (10th Cir. 
2012). 
111 Scheidelman v. Comm’r (Scheidelman I), 100 T.C.M. (CCH) 24, 31–32 (2010), vacated, 682 
F.3d 189 (2d Cir. 2012) (declining to apply penalties because taxpayer relied on a competent, 
experienced appraiser and provided necessary and accurate information to the appraiser). The Tax 
Court declined to reconsider the penalty issue on remand. Scheidelman III, 105 T.C.M. (CCH) 1117, 
1118 (2013), aff’d, 755 F.3d 148 (2d Cir. 2014). 
112 See 26 U.S.C. § 170(f)(11)(E) (2012) (defining qualified appraisal and qualified appraiser). 
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is risky without one.113 Even professional appraisals, however, can vary 
significantly in their results.114 Historic properties and other properties with 
idiosyncratic value or unusual features are even more susceptible to 
variation.115 
A few recent cases illustrate the challenges that taxpayers may face 
when valuing conservation easements. Appraisals must meet a complex set 
of criteria,116 yet recent courts have accepted appraisals as qualified to 
varying degrees. The Second Circuit, in Scheidelman II, overturned a Tax 
Court decision rendering an appraisal unqualified because the appraiser 
used the fixed percentage method, which the appraiser sold as being in line 
with historically approved cases, viewing the appraisal instead as a 
permissible, if sloppy, application of the before-and-after method.117 The 
Tax Court on remand found the valuation to be inaccurate and the true 
value to be zero because the easement provided no restriction beyond those 
already enforced by the historic district in which it was located.118 Evidence 
introduced by the IRS showed that ninety-one nearly identical appraisals 
had been previously prepared for the National Architectural Trust.119 
Depending on your point of view, this is either evidence of a demand for 
simplified valuation or the extent of possible abuse slipping through the 
cracks. 
Complicating the matter further, the D.C. Circuit upheld a similar 
appraisal as qualified in Commissioner v. Simmons, affirming the lower 
court’s decision to modify the percentage applied instead of rejecting it 
outright.120 With little justification, the Tax Court applied a 5% reduction in 
value, instead of the claimed 11% and 13%.121 Thus, while a basic appraisal 
may be deemed “qualified,” insofar as it is reasonable enough to avoid 
penalties, it is clear that a stricter standard must be met to prevail on the 
valuation amount without challenge. Comparing Scheidelman with 
 
113 The tax code generally provides a safe harbor from underpayment penalties where the taxpayer 
acts with reasonable cause and in good faith. Id. § 6664(c)(1). However, the safe harbor is only 
available in the case of conservation easement valuations where the taxpayer based the valuation on a 
qualified appraisal and separately investigated the value in good faith. Id. § 6664(c)(3). 
114 See Mariwyn Evans, How Accurate are Commercial Appraisals?, REALTOR MAG., Oct. 2011, 
http://realtormag.realtor.org/commercial/conversations/article/2011/10/how-accurate-are-commercial-
appraisals [http://perma.cc/EKM8-P45K] (finding appraisals to have a greater than 12% median 
deviation from sale prices). 
115 See William C. Harvey, II, Is the Price Right?, COM. INVESTMENT REAL EST., Jan.–Feb. 2004, 
at 36, 38 (“Valuing unique properties is challenging even for experienced practitioners.”). 
116 See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-13(c)(3)(i)–(ii) (as amended in 1996). 
117 682 F.3d 189, 197–98 (2d Cir. 2012) (stating that an appraisal is not unqualified simply because 
it is “sloppy” or “unconvincing”). 
118 Scheidelman III, 105 T.C.M. (CCH) 1117, 1122 (2013), aff’d, 755 F.3d 148 (2d Cir. 2014). 
119 Id. at 1121. 
120 646 F.3d 6, 12 (D.C. Cir. 2011).  
121 Simmons v. Comm’r, 98 T.C.M. (CCH) 211, 216–17 (2009). 
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Simmons, one is left to wonder whether the fixed percentage method is 
more palatable where the percentage applied is more modest. 
Even a thorough appraisal conducted by a highly qualified appraiser 
does not guarantee acceptance by the courts if challenged by the IRS. In a 
seventy-three-page opinion, the Tax Court in Whitehouse I rejected the 
$7,445,000 valuation submitted by the taxpayer’s expert and the IRS’s 
expert valuation of zero in favor of its own analysis, reaching a value of 
$1,792,301.122 Both experts were certified as MAI appraisers, the highest 
certification available from the Appraisal Institute, yet reached extremely 
divergent valuations.123 After the Tenth Circuit rejected the Tax Court’s 
valuation process, the Tax Court again conducted its own analysis, 
reaching a value of $1,857,716.124 Similarly, in Trout Ranch, the taxpayer’s 
expert argued for a valuation of the donated easement of $2.2 million, 
while two experts for the IRS argued for a valuation of zero.125 The Tax 
Court rejected all three experts’ valuations and employed its own complex 
analysis, reaching a valuation of $560,000.126 On appeal, the Tenth Circuit 
affirmed the Tax Court’s decision, finding no clear error in the Tax Court 
conducting its own valuation analysis.127 
These cases illustrate the risk to the taxpayer in relying on appraisals, 
even those conducted by top-certified experts. Undoubtedly, the divergence 
in valuation is exacerbated by the taxpayer’s incentive to claim the largest 
reasonable valuation and the IRS’s incentive to find a valuation of zero. 
But how can taxpayers know where the boundaries of reasonable valuation 
are without the availability of an objectively correct value? The taxpayers 
in Whitehouse and Trout Ranch missed the mark by about 400%; even 
significant reductions in claimed valuations would have been deemed 
incorrect by the IRS and the courts. 
Rather than permit the taxpayer to submit another appraisal, the Tax 
Court often conducts its own valuation analysis. Commentators have 
criticized the Tax Court for relying too heavily on comparable sales, which 
are often insufficiently comparable for the “after” valuation because of 
unique property characteristics and the small conservation easement 
market.128 Although the Tax Court is experienced and skilled in tax and 
valuation issues, accurate valuation data is simply unavailable. Further, it is 
 
122 131 T.C. 112, 118, 128–29, 171–72 (2008), vacated, 615 F.3d 321 (5th Cir. 2010). Despite its 
expert’s testimony, the IRS contended the value of the easement to be $1.15 million. Id. at 118. 
123 Id. at 118–20. 
124 Whitehouse III, 139 T.C. 304, 348 (2012), aff’d, 755 F.3d 236 (5th Cir. 2014). 
125 Trout Ranch I, 100 T.C.M. (CCH) 581, 583 (2010), aff’d, 493 F. App’x 944 (10th Cir. 2012). 
126 Id. at 585–93. 
127 Trout Ranch II, 493 F. App’x at 954. 
128 See Stephanie S. Jeane, Note, The Façade of Valuation: Why the Whitehouse Hotel Ltd. 
Partnership v. Commissioner Façade Easement Valuation Method Is Not Working, 66 TAX LAW. 501, 
511 (2013). 
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often unclear what comparable sales should be used in the valuation 
analysis.129 
Resolution of valuation through the Tax Court is also problematic 
because of the standard of review upon appeal. Appellate courts 
considering conservation easement valuation cases apply a clear error 
standard of review to the Tax Court’s decision.130 This standard means that 
whereas the Tax Court is free to spend dozens of pages conducting its own 
valuation analysis, appellate courts are more constrained and typically only 
affirm or remand the case to the Tax Court for another valuation. As 
Whitehouse III shows, a remand can result in the Tax Court conducting 
another lengthy valuation analysis that reaches roughly the same result.131 
These factual battles can last several years and use up valuable resources of 
the court, the IRS, and the taxpayer.132 
B. Cost of Appraisals and Risk of Loss Is Substantial 
The uncertainty of appraisals means that taxpayers risk substantial 
sums by claiming a deduction for the donation of a conservation easement. 
The risk to the taxpayer is the cost of an appraisal that may not hold up in 
court, and substantial penalties that may be imposed on any deficiencies. 
The risk of a penalty is exacerbated when the IRS argues, as it often does, 
that the taxpayer’s easement is without value.133 
When the IRS succeeds in arguing that a donated easement has no 
value, the taxpayer can be liable for a significant sum. In Scheidelman, the 
taxpayer paid $9,275 to the National Architectural Trust for an appraisal of 
her Brooklyn home.134 When the court eventually found the easement to 
hold no value, Scheidelman faced a total deficiency of $35,425 and total 
penalties of $7,085.135 Although the court ultimately refrained from 
upholding the penalties,136 Scheidelman still faced a combined tax bill and 
appraisal cost of $44,700. The taxpayer faced a similar burden in 
 
129 See, e.g., Whitehouse I, 131 T.C. 112, 157–58 (2008), vacated, 615 F.3d 321 (5th Cir. 2010) 
(calculating highest and best use against local non-luxury hotels’ sales instead of nonlocal luxury 
hotels). 
130 E.g., Trout Ranch II, 493 F. App’x at 951. 
131 139 T.C. 304, 348 (2012), aff’d, 755 F.3d 236 (5th Cir. 2014) (increasing its previous valuation 
of $1,792,301 to $1,857,716). 
132 The Whitehouse taxpayers claimed their deduction in 1997, but litigation did not conclude until 
2012. Id. at 309–10. 
133 See, e.g., Scheidelman III, 105 T.C.M. (CCH) 1117, 1122 (2013), aff’d, 755 F.3d 148 (2d Cir. 
2014); Trout Ranch I, 100 T.C.M. (CCH) 581, 583 (2010), aff’d, 493 F. App’x 944 (10th Cir. 2012); 
Simmons v. Comm’r, 98 T.C.M. (CCH) 211, 216 (2009); see also Jeane, supra note 128, at 511 (“The 
Service often asserts the easement is valueless.” (citing Scott D. McClure et al., Courts to IRS: Ease Up 
on Conservation Easement Valuations, 124 TAX NOTES 551, 555 (2009))). 
134 Scheidelman I, 100 T.C.M (CCH) 24, 26–27 (2010), vacated, 682 F.3d 189 (2d Cir. 2012). 
135 Id. at 24. 
136 Scheidelman III, 105 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1118. 
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Mountanos when the IRS assessed a total deficiency and penalty liability of 
over $1.5 million.137 This sum included a 40% penalty on the taxes that 
would have been owed had the taxpayer not claimed the nearly $5 million 
deduction spread out over several years.138 
Some might consider cases of high-income individuals’ tax liability to 
be a minor concern. But the larger goal of conservation is threatened if 
such high penalties and deficiency bills are allowed. Our most valuable 
natural and historic resources are often those with the greatest market (and 
idiosyncratic) value.139 The risk of large fines and deficiency bills, 
combined with the costs of appraisals and possible litigation, may cause 
owners of valuable historic properties or large tracts of open land to think 
twice about donating a conservation easement.140 The easement deduction 
is designed to incentivize easement donations, but fails to meet that goal if 
the risk of deficiencies and fines negates the tax benefit.141 
C. Valuations May Not Capture Conservation Value 
A common argument made by the IRS in recent litigation over 
conservation easement valuations is that an easement has no value because 
it fails to protect the property beyond what existing laws or regulations 
provide. In several cases, the courts have agreed. As previously discussed, 
the Tax Court in Scheidelman III found the easement to have no value 
because the easement provided no restriction beyond those already imposed 
by the Fort Greene Historic District.142 Courts in other cases have 
significantly reduced easement valuations due to existing historic district 
restrictions.143 
Similarly, the court in Mountanos found a conservation easement 
restricting development on open land to have no value because the taxpayer 
 
137 See Reilly, supra note 6. 
138 Id. 
139 Cincinnati residents recently struggled to value Union Terminal and Music Hall, which were 
both threatened by significant deterioration and on the National Trust for Historic Preservation’s 2014 
“11 Most Endangered Historic Places” list. Union Terminal, NAT’L TRUST FOR HISTORIC 
PRESERVATION, http://www.preservationnation.org/issues/11-most-endangered/locations/union-
terminal.html [http://perma.cc/4Q75-V5GK]; Music Hall, NAT’L TRUST FOR HISTORIC PRESERVATION, 
http://www.preservationnation.org/issues/11-most-endangered/locations/music-hall.html [http://perma.
cc/CBG2-R8CR]. Auditors estimated the value of the buildings in their current state to be only 
approximately $37 million combined, but supporters of a $331 million renovation plan said that price 
tag didn’t capture the full value to the community. Dan Horn, Value of Iconic Buildings Hard to 
Measure, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER (Aug. 7, 2014, 2:43 PM), http://www.cincinnati.com/story/news/
2014/06/22/value-iconic-buildings-hard-measure/11250727/ [http://perma.cc/RB7K-WM8C]. 
140 Indeed, the number of state and local land trusts has plateaued since 2005, after twenty-five 
years of extraordinary growth. McLaughlin, supra note 30, at 689–90. While donations by acreage 
continue to grow, the growth rate has slowed since 2005. Id. at 691.  
141 See Phelps, supra note 25, at 168.  
142 Scheidelman III, 105 T.C.M. (CCH) 1117, 1122 (2013), aff’d, 755 F.3d 148 (2d Cir. 2014). 
143 See, e.g., Simmons v. Comm’r, 98 T.C.M. (CCH) 211, 217 (2009). 
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could not show a higher and better use beyond recreation.144 Restrictions on 
the land imposed by the Williamson Act already prevented residential 
development, and federal land surrounding the Mountanos property 
restricted access to irrigation necessary for use as a vineyard.145 The 
taxpayer failed to provide evidence of another feasible use, rendering the 
after-value equivalent to the before-value, giving the easement no value.146 
What these decisions fail to acknowledge is that conservation 
easements provide a different level of protection because of their 
perpetuity. Laws can be amended, defunded, or repealed;147 neighboring 
land restrictions can be lifted or purchased away;148 and historic district 
regulations can be inconsistent or go unenforced.149 In contrast, land trusts 
form endowments, and easement donors are required or heavily encouraged 
to donate an amount necessary to cover the endowment’s cost of perpetual 
enforcement.150 While the market may take a long-term view, especially in 
real estate, there is a point in time where market variables become too 
complex to predict, yet the easement will persist. In cases where the 
restricting laws are unlikely to change in the near future, the perpetuity 
value may approach de minimis from a market perspective, but retain an 
above de minimis value from a conservation perspective.151 
The market is also unlikely to capture these benefits because market 
failures often result in improper valuation of the true benefits of 
 
144 Mountanos v. Comm’r, 105 T.C.M. (CCH) 1818, 1820, 1822 (2013). 
145 Id. at 1820–21. 
146 Id. at 1822. 
147 In 2007, California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger proposed cutting funding to the 
Williamson Act. Ramona Frances & Glenna Jarvis, Repeal of Williamson Act Could Change the Face 
of Central Valley’s Landscape, MADERA TRIBUNE, July 28, 2007, http://www.maderatribune.com/
news/repeal-williamson-act-could-change-face-central-valleys-landscape [http://perma.cc/B3QU-
3PGB]. Had the budget cuts gone through, the contract restricting development on the Mountanos 
property may not have been renewed. See id. (“Once these contracts expire and if the County finds it 
cannot financially support the program, it would no longer be able to protect farms, ranches and open 
space from development.”).  
148 The IRS in Mountanos only contended (and the taxpayer failed to refute) that the taxpayer 
could not obtain the necessary water permits to build a vineyard. Mountanos, 105 T.C.M. (CCH) at 
1820. Obtaining a water use permit may be a minor roadblock to a differently positioned developer. 
149 See JULIA FERRARI ET AL., LOCAL HISTORIC DISTRICTS OF NEW HAMPSHIRE 2 (2012), 
http://www.nh.gov/nhdhr/publications/documents/lhd_surveyreport2012.pdf [http://perma.cc/ZG3Y-
K7JV] (estimating that twelve of ninety-six towns in New Hampshire abandoned their historic 
commissions or districts between 2006 and 2012). 
150 See, e.g., Donating Conservation Easements: When Conservation Practices and Philanthropy 
Meet, VT. LAND TRUST, http://www.vlt.org/news-publications/publications-archive/archived-articles/
11-donating-conservation-easements [http://perma.cc/FH9P-Q6TG]. 
151 Ultimately, a valueless easement, even from a market perspective, is a legal fiction, albeit one 
that the courts have upheld. Cf. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1044 (1992) (Blackmun, 
J., dissenting) (challenging, in a four-justice dissent, the majority on the idea that a parcel of land is 
valueless simply because it is completely barred from its highest and best economic use); Richard A. 
Epstein, Why Restrain Alienation?, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 970, 972 (1985).  
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conservation. Any value gained through conservation is a positive 
externality enjoyed by the public, not necessarily the property owner. 
Additionally, because public funds for the purchase of conservation 
easements are limited, the externality is unlikely to be captured by the 
market price. 
This point is perhaps best illustrated through a hypothetical, based on 
Whitehouse, where the court reached a valuation by comparing the Kress 
and Maison Blanche buildings, combined to form a luxury hotel, to nearby 
nonluxury hotels.152 The taxpayers claimed a deduction based on the 
easement’s restrictions on building additional floors.153 Imagine a similar 
situation involving a five-story historic hotel with a facade easement placed 
on the building proscribing demolition of the building and development 
above five floors. Before the easement, perhaps the highest and best use 
would be to demolish the building and construct a ten-story nonluxury 
hotel, giving a value of $5 million. After the easement, perhaps the highest 
and best use would be to operate a five-story luxury hotel that would 
generate similar revenue and give an equivalent value of $5 million. The 
easement would be deemed to hold no value because the market is 
indifferent between a ten-story nonluxury hotel and a five-story luxury 
hotel. The IRS would likely respond by noting that the taxpayer has 
donated something with no economic value and should thus not be given a 
tax deduction. 
However, the five-story luxury hotel is producing external benefits by 
preserving a historic structure. Often, historic buildings are located in 
historic districts (with or without historic district governance) that depend 
on the collective preservation of historic buildings to maintain overall 
value. The New Orleans Vieux Carré Historic District and Canal Street 
Historic District depended on the preservation of the Kress and Maison 
Blanche buildings to help maintain the district’s value,154 but that external 
value can go unrecognized in a market-based valuation that only looks to 
the effect of the conservation easement on the individual building.155 
So why does the market fail to capture this benefit? It may be that the 
market fails to incorporate conservation value because the bargaining 
power of conservationists is so limited. If conservation benefits are second- 
and third-order benefits, accruing first in the above hypothetical to the 
Vieux Carré Historic District, then to the economic growth of New Orleans 
as a whole, and then to out-of-town visitors to the Historic District, the 
likelihood of fully capturing the conservation benefit is hindered by 
 
152 Whitehouse I, 131 T.C. 112, 157–58 (2008), vacated, 615 F.3d 321 (5th Cir. 2010). 
153 Id. at 131–32. 
154 The New Orleans Central Business District Historic District Landmark Commission rated the 
Maison Blanche building as holding “major architectural importance.” Id. at 116. 
155 See generally Colinvaux, supra note 29, at 34–38 (discussing the dichotomy between 
conservation value and lost economic value). 
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multiple layers of transaction costs. Ideally, market actors would have 
perfect information about the conservation benefits and be able to 
overcome collective action problems to aggregate the money needed to 
purchase the optimal mix of conservation easements. But it seems quite 
unlikely that land trusts have solved these problems. A market is only as 
“perfect” as the information that feeds into it. If transaction costs 
consistently prevent conservation “information” from entering the market, 
the market will consistently undervalue conservation. While the IRS might 
see valuation as purely an exercise in price discovery, the goals of the 
conservation easement deduction program are better served if external 
conservation value is also considered. 
D. Scope of Valuation Challenges and Abuse 
Naturally, the final question is how widespread are the risks to the 
taxpayer of IRS challenges? Although it is unclear exactly how many 
conservation easement deductions are challenged each year by the IRS, an 
examination of recent Tax Court data reveals the likelihood of significant 
taxpayer risk. 
In 2013, the Tax Court issued an opinion for six new cases relating to 
conservation easement deductions.156 The IRS sought gross valuation 
misstatement penalties in all cases except one.157 In litigation, the Tax 
Court avoided the question of gross valuation misstatement in two cases158 
and found a gross valuation misstatement in three other cases.159 Only in 
one case did the Tax Court deny the penalty, applying the reasonable cause 
exception, though the court applied the smaller substantial understatement 
penalty.160 
These data fail to answer how many taxpayers do not fully pursue the 
issue in court when they are denied deductions or assessed penalties for 
gross valuation misstatements. However, by extrapolating from general 
trends, one can reach a rough estimate. For fiscal year 2012, only 0.04% of 
all taxpayers receiving a notice of deficiency filed a petition with the Tax 
 
156 The Tax Court issued opinions in four additional cases in which the IRS originally argued for 
valuation-related penalties. Heard as rehearings per TAX CT. R. 161: Friedberg v. Commissioner, 106 
T.C.M. (CCH) 360 (2013); Mitchell v. Commissioner, 106 T.C.M. (CCH) 215 (2013); and Carpenter v. 
Commissioner, 106 T.C.M. (CCH) 62 (2013). Heard upon remand from an appellate court: Scheidelman 
III, 105 T.C.M. (CCH) 1117 (2013), aff’d, 755 F.3d 148 (2d Cir. 2014). 
157 Belk v. Comm’r, 140 T.C. 1 (2013); 61 York Acquisition, LLC v. Comm’r, 106 T.C.M. (CCH) 
594 (2013); Gorra v. Comm’r, 106 T.C.M. (CCH) 523 (2013); Graev v. Comm’r, 140 T.C. 377 (2013); 
Mountanos v. Comm’r, 105 T.C.M. (CCH) 1818 (2013); Pollard v. Comm’r, 105 T.C.M. (CCH) 1249 
(2013).  
158 61 York, 106 T.C.M. (CCH) at 596–97; Graev, 140 T.C. at 379 n.2. 
159 Gorra, 106 T.C.M. (CCH) at 536 (finding gross valuation misstatement); Mountanos, 105 
T.C.M. (CCH) at 1822 (same); Pollard, 105 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1255–56 (same). 
160 Pollard, 105 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1256. 
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Court.161 In recent years, about 2% of all Tax Court cases have actually 
been tried and decided, with about 80% settled and about 18% dismissed.162 
Thus, based on the above data, the six conservation easement 
valuation cases in 2013 would represent about 300 cases filed in the Tax 
Court and thousands of notices of deficiency received by taxpayers. The 
notice of deficiency calculation is clearly unrealistic as only 2933 taxpayers 
claimed the deduction in 2010, totaling $766 million.163 With an average 
deduction of over $260,000, one can assume that taxpayers claiming the 
deduction are sophisticated enough to file in the Tax Court at a much 
higher rate than the general public and less likely to settle out of court. But 
even assuming a file rate of 100% instead of 0.04%, the data suggest that at 
least 10% of taxpayers claiming the deduction are receiving notices of 
deficiency and are at substantial risk of deficiency liability and gross 
misstatement valuation penalties. 
Of course, it is possible—or even likely—that the IRS is cracking 
down because taxpayers are abusing the latitude inherent in appraisals.164 In 
all three cases in 2013 where the Tax Court found a gross valuation 
misstatement, the IRS claimed the conservation easement to be valueless.165 
However, in Pollard v. Commissioner and Gorra v. Commissioner, the 
court found the easement to have significant value (though far less than 
claimed by the taxpayer),166 while in Mountanos, the court declined to affix 
a value, deciding only that the taxpayer failed to prove any value.167 Past 
cases follow a pattern similar to Pollard and Gorra.168 
This pattern suggests that either (1) there is a wide range of plausible 
values and thus taxpayer “abuse” is merely claiming the best plausible 
value, (2) many certified appraisers are willing to give grossly inflated 
values, or (3) the IRS is engaging in similar abuse in undervaluing 
 
161 NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2012 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 82 n.43 (2012), 
http://www.taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/userfiles/file/Full-Report/Volume-2.pdf [http://perma.cc/9B8P-
7857]. 
162 See id. at 83. 
163 Rubin, supra note 33. 
164 Janet Novack, Feds Sue Trust Over Historic Easement Tax Breaks, FORBES (June 16, 2011, 
1:52 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/janetnovack/2011/06/16/feds-sue-trust-over-historic-easement-
tax-breaks/ [http://perma.cc/Z28E-WLJ3] (reporting on IRS lawsuit against the Trust for Architectural 
Easements, claiming abusive valuation practices). 
165 Gorra v. Comm’r, 106 T.C.M. (CCH) 523, 534 (2013); Mountanos v. Comm’r, 105 T.C.M. 
(CCH) 1818, 1818 (2013); Pollard, 105 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1249. 
166 Gorra, 106 T.C.M. (CCH) at 536; Pollard, 105 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1255. 
167 Mountanos, 105 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1819 n.2. 
168 See, e.g., Trout Ranch I, 100 T.C.M. (CCH) 581, 591–92 (2010), aff’d, 493 F. App’x 944 (10th 
Cir. 2012). 
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conservation easements. Perhaps the Tax Court’s willingness to engage in 
its own valuation implies that one or both of the latter two are occurring.169 
Strong evidence also exists that many taxpayers shopped around for 
favorable appraisals and then used the appraisal to shield themselves from 
penalties.170 At least one easement-holding organization promoted appraisal 
shopping as no-risk to the taxpayer, even guaranteeing the return of any 
associated donation if the tax benefit was denied.171 The Tax Court’s recent 
responses only muddy the issue, as obtaining a qualified appraisal is in 
some cases sufficient to avoid penalties, but in other cases, the court has 
required that the taxpayer conduct some additional level of investigation 
into the appraisal’s veracity, especially if the taxpayer has some base of 
relevant knowledge.172 Of course the mixed case law may be attributed to 
the difficulty in divining which cases deserve penalties and which do not 
because taxpayers come with varying levels of knowledge and expertise.173 
Abuse is obviously problematic for the IRS, but should also concern 
conservationists. Abusive valuation spends limited resources on taxpayer 
windfalls instead of additional conservation and, if widespread, threatens 
the deduction’s future. Conservationists should work with the IRS to 
identify ways to curb abuse without also curbing proper easement donation. 
Unfortunately, the uncertainty inherent in the current valuation system 
means the IRS will always face an uphill battle in trying to stop—or even 
identify—abusive valuation. A new way forward is needed, or this 
troubling trend of litigation will continue and is bound to harm easements 
as a conservation tool, if it hasn’t already. 
III. A NEW VALUATION PROPOSAL 
Given that the current conservation easement valuation system relies 
on inherently inaccurate appraisals, a market-value approach that fails to 
fully capture conservation value, and easily abused valuation practices, it is 
no surprise that many writers have proposed alternatives.174 While these 
 
169 It is likely no coincidence that before the IRS began targeting abusive conservation easements, 
the Tax Court was loath to conduct its own valuation analyses. See, e.g., Nicoladis v. Comm’r, 55 
T.C.M. (CCH) 624, 629 (1988) (“Any judgment of our own would be tainted with the same concerns 
[raised by experts for both the taxpayer and the IRS].”); Hilborn v. Comm’r, 85 T.C. 677, 699 (1985) 
(acknowledging validity of taxpayer’s valuation concerns but adopting IRS’s valuation as “objective” 
rather than taxpayer’s “subjective” valuation). 
170 Novack, supra note 164.  
171 Graev v. Comm’r, 140 T.C. 377, 381 (2013) (discussing “side letter” sent to taxpayer by the 
National Architectural Trust (now Trust for Architectural Easements) offering a return of the donation 
if the deduction were denied). 
172 Compare Scheidelman I, 100 T.C.M. (CCH) 24, 31–32 (2010), vacated, 682 F.3d 189 (2d Cir. 
2012), with Rothman v. Comm’r, 104 T.C.M. (CCH) 127, 127 (2012). 
173 Compare Graev, 140 T.C. at 382 (taxpayer occupation of attorney), with Scheidelman I, 100 
T.C.M. (CCH) at 31–32 (taxpayer is layperson). 
174 See infra Part III.A. 
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alternative schemes are often novel and attempt to improve promotion of 
conservation or reduce administration costs, none strike the appropriate 
balance between conservation, administration, and accuracy of value. As an 
alternative, this Note proposes the use of “alternative minimum value” as 
both a safe harbor for taxpayers and a better capture of conservation value. 
A. Recent Proposals Fail to Solve Valuation Problems 
1. Tax Credits and Direct Spending.—A common proposal is to do 
away with the charitable deduction donation scheme altogether and replace 
it with an alternative method of promoting conservation. Professor Daniel 
Halperin suggests replacing the deduction with a direct spending program 
(as opposed to the indirect “spending” from tax deductions and credits).175 
The direct spending would come in the form of grants to developers and 
target properties with greater conservation value.176 However, as others 
have noted, a direct spending program would make already scarce 
resources even scarcer177 and allocate those resources less efficiently.178 
Professor Halperin also suggests a refundable tax credit,179 an idea 
shared by other authors.180 Such proposals either explicitly state or assume 
that the tax credit amount would be calculated as a fixed percentage applied 
to the value of the property before the easement.181 Halperin would model 
conservation easement tax credits after the low-income tax credit program, 
which has successfully promoted affordable housing projects.182 The credits 
would be capped, and distribution would be determined through application 
to the Bureau of Land Management or state agencies.183 Elliott Wolf 
proposes simply replacing the deduction with refundable, uncapped tax 
 
175 Daniel Halperin, A Better Way to Encourage Gifts of Conservation Easements, 70 EXEMPT 
ORG. TAX REV. 193, 197 (2012). 
176 Id. 
177 Deal, supra note 18, at 1608 (“A direct-spending program . . . would by political necessity 
involve allocation of a fixed dollar amount of funds.”). Recent pressures to cut discretionary spending 
across-the-board have resulted in cuts even in programs that are revenue-positive, such as IRS 
enforcement. Chuck Marr & Joel Friedman, Cuts in IRS Budget Have Compromised Taxpayer Service 
and Weakened Enforcement, CENTER ON BUDGET AND POL’Y PRIORITIES (June 25, 2014), 
http://www.cbpp.org/cms/?fa=view&id=4156 [http://perma.cc/SAY2-HG44] (reporting on a Treasury 
study showing that every dollar invested in IRS enforcement returns six dollars to the federal 
government).  
178 Colinvaux, supra note 29, at 48 (“[T]he tax expenditure likely results in lower costs per acre . . . 
than a direct spending program.”); see also supra notes 27–30 and accompanying text. 
179 Halperin, supra note 175, at 197–98. Instead of decreasing the amount of income subject to tax 
as a deduction does, a refundable tax credit is a direct payment to the taxpayer, regardless of the level of 
taxable income.  
180 Colinvaux, supra note 29, at 41–46, 49–60; Wolf, supra note 21, at 326–30. 
181 Colinvaux, supra note 29, at 49–51; Halperin, supra note 175, at 197–98; Wolf supra note 21, 
at 329. 
182 Halperin, supra note 175, at 197. 
183 Id. at 197–98. 
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credits, arguing that tax credits more efficiently promote conservation and 
are unaffected by donor wealth or income.184 Finally, Professor Roger 
Colinvaux suggests a refundable tax credit broken down into different tiers 
based on the level of restriction provided by the easement.185 
Refundable, capped tax credits fail to address the underlying problem 
with the current valuation system for three reasons. First, tax credits apply 
a fixed percentage to the before-value, reaching a value for the 
conservation easement that may be unrelated to the value of conservation 
achieved or cost to the taxpayer. The taxpayer is then incentivized to 
donate the minimum qualifying easement, maximizing the gap between the 
tax credit and the easement’s actual value. While Colinvaux’s tiered system 
is more nuanced, it merely reduces, rather than eliminates, this counter-
productive incentive. 
Second, tax credits fail to provide any offsetting reduction in 
administrative costs. In fact, requiring agencies to evaluate tax credit 
applications, necessary in a capped or tiered system, adds administrative 
costs to both the government and the applicant. Although costs to the IRS 
and the courts would undoubtedly decrease, it seems unlikely that agency 
review of each application would be cheaper than targeted litigation. 
Finally, a capped tax credit system would unnecessarily politicize 
conservation. Each time Congress considered a new budget proposal, the 
amount of conservation tax credits would become a budgetary issue. Tax 
deductions do not require any appropriations from Congress and are limited 
only by the public’s appetite.186 
2. Easement Qualification Regulation.—If replacing the current 
deduction with a tax credit is undesirable, surely improvements can be 
made to curb abuse and limit litigation. Some have proposed making the 
conservation easement deduction more difficult to claim.187 Presumably, 
taxpayers with more valuable easements or those more committed to the 
conservation cause will be more willing to overcome barriers to claiming 
the deduction. Further, the taxpayer is incentivized to increase the level of 
restriction in the easement to meet a higher qualification standard. 
Historic preservation expert Jess Phelps recently advanced the simple 
proposition that conservation organizations should require more restrictive 
 
184 Wolf, supra note 21, at 329–30. 
185 Colinvaux, supra note 29, at 50–52. 
186 The current effort to reinstate the 2006 expanded benefits is instructive here. Despite 
widespread support, the initiative failed in 2013. If Congress were required to periodically review the 
conservation easement deduction, it is unlikely that it would be consistently renewed. See supra notes 
33–35 and accompanying text. Also instructive is the Historic Tax Credit, currently under threat of 
repeal and a focus of the National Trust for Historic Preservation’s lobbying efforts. Historic Tax 
Credits, NAT’L TRUST FOR HISTORIC PRESERVATION, http://www.preservationnation.org/take-
action/advocacy-center/policy-resources/historic-tax-credits.html [http://perma.cc/9MYX-LEPN]. 
187 McLaughlin, supra note 43, at 109; Phelps, supra note 25, at 161–62.  
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easements from their donors.188 Phelps theorizes that if the taxpayer is 
currently at greater risk of deduction disqualification, conservation 
organizations can convince the taxpayer to donate a more restrictive 
easement whose valuation is more likely to be upheld.189 
Although this goal is laudable, it is also unrealistic. Just as with 
appraisers, taxpayers can shop around for a conservation organization that 
will accept the desired level of restriction or valuation.190 Indeed, if cases 
like Scheidelman and Graev are any indication, at least one major 
conservation group is pursuing taxpayers for conservation easement 
donations that skirt the line of abuse.191 Further, increasing the required 
level of development restriction does not necessarily increase the likelihood 
that the valuation is correct. A more restrictive easement ostensibly results 
in a larger diminution in the property’s value, so the taxpayer may actually 
feel entitled to a larger deduction. 
Professor Nancy McLaughlin recently suggested that the IRS make 
available to taxpayers advance rulings on easement qualification and 
valuation.192 The taxpayer would first complete the easement donation and 
submit an appraisal to the IRS.193 The IRS would then accept the appraisal 
or calculate its own valuation, binding the taxpayer to its decision.194 But as 
McLaughlin admits, taxpayers would only pursue an advance ruling if the 
IRS could be trusted to reach a fair valuation.195 Considering the number of 
previously cited cases where the IRS pursued a very low valuation or a 
valuation of zero, it seems unlikely that many taxpayers would pursue an 
advance ruling. 
3. Easement Valuation Restrictions.—Other commentators have 
focused on restricting the amount of the deduction a taxpayer can claim, 
either through limits on valuation or limits on the deduction itself. 
Stephanie Jeane proposed, in response to the Whitehouse decision, that a 
fixed percentage be applied to the before-value of a property based on the 
loss of the rights to develop or to control the exterior of a historic 
building.196 While Jeane’s method only addresses facade easements, it 
would be a simple matter to devise a similar fixed percentage for open land 
easements or other conservation easements. 
 
188 Phelps, supra note 25, at 162–64. 
189 Id. at 163. 
190 See Novack, supra note 164. The IRS’s lawsuit against the Trust for Architectural Easements 
also demanded the names of 800 easement donors. Id. 
191 See Graev v. Comm’r, 140 T.C. 377, 381–87 (2013); Scheidelman I, 100 T.C.M (CCH) 24, 24–
25 (2010), vacated, 682 F.3d 189 (2d Cir. 2012); see also Novack, supra note 164. 




196 Jeane, supra note 128, at 513–16. 
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Jeane acknowledges that such a proposal places administration 
efficiency above accuracy.197 Some taxpayers would donate minimally 
restrictive easements and receive a windfall, while other taxpayers would 
be discouraged from donating high-value easements because the full value 
would not be captured. When Jeane applied her own method to the 
Whitehouse properties, the result was a value below the finding of the court 
and far below that claimed by the taxpayer.198 Determining a fixed 
percentage that would apply fairly to even a majority of conservation 
easements would seem to be an impossible task. Generally, rules—as 
opposed to standards—are less effective where the objects of regulation are 
more dissimilar from each other.199 Because of the extreme variability in 
both property and easements characteristics, attempting to replace the 
current standard-based system with a rule-based system (especially one so 
simple) would inevitably lead to extreme inequities.200 
Alternatively, Kate Deal suggests capping the value of conservation 
easements that could be accepted by a land trust each year, based on a 
multiplier of annual cash donations received.201 Because a conservation 
easement requires a donee as well as a donor, limiting land trusts’ (the 
organizations holding and enforcing the easements) acceptance of 
donations theoretically limits the overall number of donations. Deal 
theorizes that the land trust’s desire to accept as much conservation 
easement value as possible each year would pressure the donor to submit a 
reasonable, or even low, valuation.202 She further argues it would shift 
much of the cost of qualification and valuation enforcement from the IRS 
to land trusts, which are perhaps better qualified to assess conservation 
purpose and easement value.203 Presumably, competition among donors and 
land trusts would further develop the conservation easement market.204 
As Deal acknowledges, land trusts with large cash resources might 
consistently fail to meet the cap and not be incentivized to effectively 
police easement valuations.205 For example, the standard practice of the 
Trust for Architectural Easements, a group criticized by the IRS,206 is to 
request a cash donation in conjunction with a donated easement.207 The 
 
197 Id. at 516. 
198 Id. at 509, 516. 
199 Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 600 (1992).  
200 See id. at 591 (“[T]he simple rule is both over- and underinclusive compared to the more 
complex standard.”). 
201 Deal, supra note 18, at 1611–17.  
202 Id. at 1613. 
203 Id. at 1615. 
204 Id. at 1612. 
205 Id. at 1616. 
206 Novack, supra note 164. 
207 Program Q&A, TRUST FOR ARCHITECTURAL EASEMENTS, http://architecturaltrust.org/
easements/program-qa/ [http://perma.cc/Y6BS-YRYG].  
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cash donations are used to enforce the easements held by the Trust.208 This 
arrangement would permit the Trust to effectively avoid any cap as every 
donation would increase their ceiling. 
Deal suggests that if abuses recur, the IRS could resort to revoking a 
land trust’s tax-exempt status.209 Indeed, the IRS recently succeeded in 
obtaining an injunction against the Trust for Architectural Easements for 
what the IRS alleged was a scheme encouraging overvaluation of 
conservation easements.210 Although the success of the injunction in 
preventing abuse remains to be seen, the IRS surely spent a large sum on 
the lawsuit and the accompanying 300 audits.211 The IRS is now ten years 
into its campaign against abusive easement valuations, yet litigation (and 
its associated costs) continues apace. 
Further, incentives between the donor and the donee would become 
misaligned. Land trusts would have the incentive to require high cash 
donations or undervalue easements to fit more under the cap, in direct 
conflict with the taxpayer’s (legitimate) desire to maximize the tax benefit 
of a donation. However, the burden of identifying and litigating abuse is 
likely then to shift to the taxpayers, who are surely far less equipped to 
combat undervaluation abuse than the IRS is to combat overvaluation. This 
is not to say that land trusts will at all act maliciously, but not aggressively 
pursuing the maximum donation may be grounds for a taxpayer challenge. 
Both Jeane’s and Deal’s proposals have the ultimate effect of shifting the 
litigation burden away from the IRS and to the taxpayer. 
B. “Alternative Minimum Value” Is a New Way Forward 
Current proposals do not adequately address the conservation 
easement valuation problem without introducing countervailing costs that 
outweigh their benefits. Further, a deduction (or credit) program based 
solely on market valuation is imprecise, prone to abuse, and fails to capture 
conservation benefits accruing to the community. But without flexible 
valuation, some taxpayers will receive windfalls, while others will be 
discouraged from donating valuable easements. 
To avoid many of these valuation problems and better promote 
conservation, I propose the implementation of what I term “alternative 
minimum valuation.” Under this proposal, when a taxpayer claims the 
conservation easement deduction, she may elect to either claim an 
easement value backed by an appraisal (as the current system permits) or 
 
208 Id. 
209 Deal, supra note 18, at 1616–17. 
210 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, D.C. Fed. Court Bars Co. from Promoting Alleged Tax 
Scheme Involving Improper Easements on Historic Buildings (July 18, 2011), available at http://www.
justice.gov/opa/pr/dc-federal-court-bars-company-promoting-alleged-tax-scheme-involving-improper-
easements [http://perma.cc/5XTP-7T33]. 
211 See Novack, supra note 164. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
768 
choose the alternative minimum valuation. The alternative minimum value 
would be equal to a small fixed percentage of the before-value of the 
property. This minimum value provides a basic level of compensation to 
the taxpayer for donating a conservation easement while avoiding the costs 
and uncertainty of valuing the easement. By making alternative minimum 
valuation an election, the taxpayer is still free to claim a larger donation, 
provided she can justify that valuation through the current process. 
The fixed percentage applied would be a small percentage, both to 
prevent abuse and to reflect the principle advanced in Evans v. 
Commissioner that every conservation easement provides some minimum 
level of restriction and probable loss to the taxpayer.212 Alternative 
minimum valuation would thus capture value at two points where, as 
previously discussed, the market fails to do so: the value of perpetual 
protection against possible changes in existing laws and regulations, and 
the positive externalities that accrue to neighboring properties and 
surrounding communities. Alternative minimum valuation ensures some 
compensation to the taxpayer for providing those benefits. 
Application of a fixed percentage to determine an easement’s value is 
not a new concept. Although the Tax Court has repeatedly rejected the use 
of a predetermined rate in valuation,213 even the IRS recognizes a typical 
range and has used that range to determine which taxpayers to audit.214 At 
least three authors have recently recommended the use of fixed 
percentages.215 However, applying a fixed percentage based even on the 
low end of typical donations, such as 10%, would undoubtedly result in a 
windfall to those who donate minimally qualified easements and provide a 
strong incentive for abuse. 
Alternative minimum valuation would use a much smaller fixed 
percentage, high enough to capture the minimum benefits of a donation, but 
low enough to avoid windfalls and abuse. Rather than attempt to determine 
that percentage myself, I propose the IRS convene a panel of conservation 
experts to determine what minimum percentage should be applied. This 
panel would be similar to one proposed by Professor McLaughlin, modeled 
after the successful Art Advisory Panel and a 1987 Treasury proposal.216 
Unlike McLaughlin’s panel, which would promulgate comprehensive 
 
212 100 T.C.M. (CCH) 275, 279 (2010) (“We note that ordinarily any encumbrance on real 
property, howsoever slight, would tend to have some negative effect on that property’s fair market 
value. Even a nominal encumbrance that is placed by the current owner of the property would, at the 
very least, deprive a subsequent owner of the opportunity of placing a similar encumbrance on that 
property.”). 
213 Scheidelman III, 105 T.C.M. (CCH) 1117, 1121 (2013), aff’d, 755 F.3d 148 (2d Cir. 2014) 
(citing Nicoladis v. Comm’r, 55 T.C.M. (CCH) 624, 629 (1988)). 
214 See Scheidelman I, 100 T.C.M (CCH) 24, 26 (2010), vacated, 682 F.3d 189 (2d Cir. 2012) 
(citing an early-2000s IRS training manual). 
215 Colinvaux, supra note 29, at 38; Jeane, supra note 128, at 514–15; Wolf, supra note 21, at 329. 
216 McLaughlin, supra note 43, at 89–90. 
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valuation standards, this panel would only be tasked with determining an 
appropriate minimum percentage. The panel should have the freedom to 
determine different percentages for different classes of property, such as 
open land or historic buildings, as the minimum considerations are likely 
different. 
Use of alternative minimum valuation would also decrease 
administrative, litigation, and deficiency costs to the IRS while providing 
the taxpayer the opportunity to claim the deduction at a much lower risk of 
challenge. The IRS could focus its efforts more acutely on those deductions 
that are truly abusive, rather than merely difficult to value, and relieve the 
Tax Court of conducting lengthy valuations of their own.217 The taxpayer 
would also avoid the cost of appraisal, often several thousand dollars. The 
reduced cost and improved certainty would open up the conservation 
easement tax deduction to less wealthy individuals and spread its adoption 
as a tool of conservation. 
In many cases, the value of the conservation easement would be 
significantly greater than the alternative minimum valuation. Successful 
valuations typically range from 10%–15% of the property’s before-value.218 
Alternative minimum valuation would permit the taxpayer to instead claim 
the larger deduction, if supported by a qualified appraisal in accordance 
with current regulations. Owners of high-value properties would thus 
remain encouraged to place substantially restrictive conservation 
easements. Of course, the valuation pitfalls remain, but at least the taxpayer 
can decide whether the value of the higher deduction is worth the risk of 
audit or litigation, rather than the all-or-nothing approach currently 
permitted. For less wealthy owners of properties that are still worth 
protecting, such as middle-class homeowners, the alternative minimum 
value is a quick and easy way to protect their land and get a deduction they 
might not otherwise deem worthwhile. 
One point of concern with the use of alternative minimum valuation 
would be that taxpayers might donate illusory or deficient conservation 
easements to claim the minimum deduction. However, existing law already 
stipulates minimum characteristics that an easement must have if placed on 
a building in a registered historic district.219 The IRS, perhaps through the 
advisory panel, could develop a set of minimum characteristics that a 
conservation easement must have to claim the alternative minimum 
valuation.220 Qualification standardization would also help less wealthy 
 
217 Though equipped to do so, the Tax Court has previously discouraged the IRS from using the 
courts as a forum for hashing out valuation disputes. Id. at 86. 
218 See Scheidelman II, 682 F.3d 189, 196 (2d Cir. 2012) (noting the validity of evidence, including 
an out-of-print IRS publication, in the taxpayer’s appraisal showing a typical range of 10%–15%).  
219 26 U.S.C. § 170 (h)(4)(B) (2012). 
220 For historic buildings, this could be as simple as requiring compliance with the Secretary of the 
Interior’s Standards for the Treatment of Historic Properties. See Secretary of the Interior’s Standards 
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taxpayers more easily claim the deduction. And because alternative 
minimum valuation is an election, taxpayers would be free to find other 
ways to structure easements, subject to the stricter valuation process 
currently in place. In the event that taxpayers pursue alternative easement 
structures, the existence of a clear framework would help the IRS better 
identify abuse and help taxpayers justify deviations from the norm, 
smoothing or even reducing litigation. 
Some might argue that even if minimum qualifications were set, 
taxpayers might still claim easements that do not truly provide protection 
because of overlap with existing law.221 Indeed, the IRS has expressed 
strong opposition to the use of the fixed percentage method for largely this 
reason.222 But as previously discussed, conservation easements provide a 
benefit of perpetuity, protecting a property even if laws change or are 
repealed in the future. However, if the IRS (or advisory panel) continued to 
find the perpetuity benefit to be too small or too speculative, the minimum 
characteristics could include a provision that the easement must 
substantially restrict development in a manner not currently prohibited by 
law.223 Although such a rule might crowd out properties located in historic 
districts, those property owners could still pursue the deduction without the 
alternative minimum valuation election. 
Others might argue that a deduction should only reflect what the 
taxpayer donated, ignoring external benefits accrued by the conservation 
easement. This argument is hardly unique to conservation easements, 
however, as the tax code is commonly—perhaps, increasingly—used to 
effect policy changes through tax deductions, credits, or penalties in lieu of 
direct spending or fining.224 Opposition on these grounds speaks to a larger 
debate on the efficiencies of the tax code. But if compensating taxpayers 
for the creation of positive conservation externalities begets greater positive 
externalities, why shouldn’t this behavior be encouraged?225 
 
for the Treatment of Historic Properties, NAT’L PARK SERVICE, http://www.nps.gov/tps/standards.htm 
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222 Karin Gross, IRS Office of Chief Counsel, Remarks in Trying Times: Important Lessons to be 
Learned From Recent Federal Tax Cases Involving Conservation Easements (May 20, 2014) (audio 
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alterations” without “stifling Congress’ aim to encourage legitimate easements”). 
224 Cf., e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2600 (2012) (upholding the 
Affordable Care Act’s individual mandate as a tax). 
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Alternative minimum valuation reflects the reality that the flexibility 
of the current valuation system is necessary, yet is unable to effectively 
capture conservation value or avoid abuse on its own. Allowing taxpayers 
the choice of alternative minimum valuation provides the proper incentives 
for conservation easement donations, makes the deduction more accessible 
to nonwealthy individuals, and reduces the significant costs of IRS policing 
and taxpayer risk. Further, wealthy individuals and high-value property 
owners, who are likely to be more sophisticated donors, will be free and 
better able to evaluate the trade-off between the risks and rewards inherent 
in the two options. 
Finally, alternative minimum valuation is preferable to other proposals 
because of the simplicity of implementation. Alternative minimum 
valuation can be integrated into the valuation scheme with the simple 
passage of a single Treasury regulation. While qualified appraisals are 
defined by statute,226 valuation is left to Treasury regulations and 
publications, which can be altered without Congressional approval.227 A tax 
credit program would require comprehensive federal legislation, and 
significant modifications of the current valuation regime would require 
passage of several complex regulations. Once the IRS determined the fixed 
percentage to be used, implementation of alternative minimum valuation 
would be comparatively easy. 
CONCLUSION 
As many commentators have noted, the current system of valuing 
conservation easements is broken. Appraisals are costly, inaccurate, and do 
little to protect the taxpayer from deficiencies and penalties or the IRS from 
abuse. The IRS has challenged many conservation easement deductions 
recently, resulting in the Tax Court settling questions of valuation and 
taxpayers seeing significant penalties. This broken system undermines the 
goals of the conservation easement deduction program and threatens to 
curb conservation efforts. 
To resolve many of these problems, I propose that the taxpayer be 
permitted to claim an alternative minimum valuation, applied as a small 
fixed percentage to the before-value of the property. By giving the taxpayer 
an option to pursue a streamlined, low-cost way to claim the conservation 
easement deduction, taxpayers can more easily and cheaply participate in 
the program, costs of enforcement and valuation to the IRS and the Tax 
 
my proposal, rather than lose out on the benefits of the easement, the historic district (through the 
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Court will drop, abuse will be curbed, and the deduction will better reflect 
the conservation value that the market fails to capture. Adoption of 
alternative minimum valuation will further incentivize adoption of 
conservation easements and become a valuable tool for conservationists. 
 
